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Abstract 
This symposium highlighted the relevance of the cultural theory (CT) pioneered by anthropologists Mary 
Douglas, Steve Rayner, and Michael Thompson and political scientists Aaron Wildavsky and Richard 
Ellis for explaining political phenomena. In this concluding article, we suggest ways in which CT can be 
further tested and developed. First, we describe how the theory has been applied thus far and some of the 
achievements of these applications. Then, we examine some of the challenges revealed by this research. 
Finally, we discuss ways of applying CT that promise to help meet these challenges. These methods 
include nesting case studies and combining case study and survey research, simulations, experiments, and 
approaches from social neuroscience. 
 
 
This symposium highlighted the relevance of the cultural theory (CT) pioneered by anthropologists Mary 
Douglas, Steve Rayner, and Michael Thompson and political scientists Aaron Wildavsky and Richard 
Ellis for explaining political phenomena. In this concluding article, we suggest ways in which CT can be 
further tested and developed. First, we describe how the theory has been applied thus far and some of the 
achievements of these applications. Then, we examine some of the challenges revealed by this research. 
Finally, we discuss ways of applying CT that promise to help meet these challenges. These methods 
include nesting case studies and combining case study and survey research, simulations, experiments, and 
approaches from social neuroscience. 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN TESTING CULTURAL THEORY 
To discuss the past achievements of, and remaining challenges for, tests of CT, we find it helpful to 
present the theory as a sequence of hypotheses to which we will refer throughout the article. CT 
hypothesizes the following: 
There are only four viable ways of organizing social relations: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, 
and fatalism. 
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These four ways of organizing are derived from assigning “high” and “low” values to two dimensions of 
social life: the extent to which people are incorporated into a larger social setting (“group” or collectivity) 
and the degree to which people are regulated and ranked (“grid” or stratification). Hierarchy combines a 
high degree of both stratification and collectivity; individualism is low on both stratification and 
collectivity; fatalism is high in stratification and low in collectivity; and egalitarianism scores high on 
collectivity but low on stratification. 
Each way of organizing is supported by (and in turn supports) a “cultural bias,” that is, a compatible 
pattern of perceiving, justifying, reasoning, and feeling. The latter includes perceptions of time, space, 
nature, human nature, justice, risk, blame, leadership, and governance. Together, the patterns of social 
relations, and corresponding biases, are called cultures or “ways of life.” 
These ways of life cannot exist in a pure form as they all include features that make them self-
undermining and that can only be compensated for by the other ways of life. 
As a result, the ways of life emerge simultaneously and—because they embody opposing organizational 
and normative principles—in contradistinction to each other. 
Hypotheses Four and Five mean that anything that is organized—from the highest (global) level to the 
lowest (individual) level—is a combination of the four ways of life. 
This combination is always changing due to the continuous splitting and merging, as well as waxing and 
waning, of the four ways of life. 
Attempts to deal with social problems that are not based on a careful consideration of all four ways of life 
are counter-productive. Not only will these attempts fail according to the goals and values prioritized in 
the neglected ways of life, but these will also fail on their own terms—as each way of organizing and 
perceiving is complementary to, and codependent with, the other three. 
More effective attempts to resolve social problems are based, therefore, on a careful consideration of all 
four cultural perspectives on what constitutes a problem and a solution and tend to consist of 
combinations of all these four ways of life. 
Several of these hypotheses have been subjected to extensive empirical testing. Hypotheses Eight and 
Nine have been confirmed in a series of case studies, covering such diverse issue-areas as the Russian and 
Chinese transitions to capitalism, the post-war reconstruction of Birmingham and Munich, the attempt to 
prevent global warming with the Kyoto Protocol, anti-discrimination measures in Holland, the 
environmental restoration of the Rhine, and water policies in Nepal after independence (Hendriks 1999; 
Verweij 2011; Verweij and Thompson 2006). Such confirmation is promising, but the methodological 
weaknesses of case study research are well known, including limited generalizability due to the small 
number of observations (the “small n” problem). Furthermore, there is arguably more room for the 
analyst's biases to influence the conclusions of his or her research. One challenge for future research is to 
overcome these traditional shortcomings of case study research. 
Other studies have been statistical in nature and have mainly concerned Hypothesis Three. With the help 
of surveys, these applications have sought to predict people's policy preferences, risk attitudes, or political 
views from their cultural biases. Some of the best work in this regard is exemplified by the other 
contributions to this symposium (i.e., Gastil et al. 2011, this issue; Jones 2011, this issue; Ripberger, 
Jenkins-Smith, and Herron 2011, this issue). Results have been generally positive. Typically, survey-
based tests have found significant correlations between people's preferences and their biases. 
Furthermore, they have shown that CT is frequently a more powerful predictor than alternative 
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approaches (e.g., Coughlin and Lockhart 1998; Ellis and Thompson 1997; Grendstad and Selle 1997; Olli 
2011). Still, challenges for future research surface here as well. In particular, note that although CT is 
often a better predictor of people's political views than other frameworks, the absolute degree of variance 
explained remains somewhat limited in view of the theory's ambitious claims (Grendstad 1999, 465; 
Kahan 2008, 4; Rippl 2002). This finding need not be a cause for great concern, however, as CT includes 
several features that make it more difficult to fairly test the approach through surveys (Rayner 1992). This 
argument is explained in the next four paragraphs. In a nutshell, we argue that—because of various 
features of the theory—it is hard to test the theory with the help of surveys. In other words, in our eyes, 
surveys (as they have thus far been undertaken) do not represent fair tests of the theory, and should be 
improved. Moreover, we believe that future survey research can be designed to reduce the confounding 
influence of these features. To show how this might be done, we need to identify which traits of CT make 
it difficult to subject the approach to survey-based tests. 
One such trait is the hypothesized presence of fatalism. The distrust that is a hallmark of this way of life 
may fuel respondents' unwillingness to answer, or honestly answer, survey questions. Fatalists' “don't 
care” attitude toward public issues may fuel rather erratic, or contradictory, answers to survey queries. 
This attitude makes it more difficult to identify fatalism through surveys, and also prevents one from 
getting a clear glimpse of the other ways of life. 
Another problem flows from CT's assumption that people have “multiple selves” (Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky 1990, 265–67). That is to say, the way(s) of life to which an individual adheres can vary with 
the social domain in which he or she participates. For example, a person may be more of an individualist 
at work, prefer more egalitarian relations in a classroom setting, switch to deep fatalism when supporting 
the Chicago Cubs baseball team or the Feyenoord Rotterdam football club, and act in a more hierarchical 
fashion with his or her children. This feature of the theory makes it vital to be aware of the social context 
in which survey respondents are approached as well as how the social context is reshaped by the arrival of 
researchers bearing surveys. 
A final hurdle is thrown up by the dynamic nature of CT (Thompson 2008). The theory posits that four 
ways of life tend to be present—forever waxing and waning, splitting and merging—in any social setting, 
be that a family, political party, university, or international regime. These dynamics are driven by the 
enduring efforts of actors, in specific social settings, to promote their preferred ways of life. These 
dynamics then spur them on to constantly update, improve, and revise the concrete arguments actors use 
to justify their preferred ways of life—in light of past experiences and the counter-claims of those 
favoring other ways of life (Douglas 1999). In other words, actors never cease to adapt their concrete 
arguments and policy preferences, although their fundamental assumptions regarding nature, human 
nature, risk, justice, and so remain unchanged. As a consequence, overly general survey questions will not 
always effectively tap into people's cultural biases as manifested in concrete social settings. 
Unfortunately, the survey questions that Karl Dake, Michael Thompson, and Aaron Wildavsky developed 
in the early 1990s, which were widely used in subsequent research, display such generality (Dake 1992; 
Wildavsky and Dake 1990). 
The following example may make this point clear: One of the five survey questions that measure people's 
preference for hierarchy is “The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the customs and 
practices of our past.” Respondents are asked to reveal their degree of agreement on a five-point Likert 
scale; a high level of concurrence indicates a preference for hierarchy. The problem is that, depending on 
the specifics of time and place, adherents to other ways of life may concur as well. When a country has 
low taxes, a pluralist democracy, flourishing civil society, vibrant private sector, and night watchman 
state, then those respondents favoring individualism will agree with the question. When a country has lots 
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of consensual, local decision making, high income equality, little private property, and a widely shared 
environmental ethic, then those individuals upholding egalitarianism will be in accord, too. Indeed, in 
both these situations individuals who are drawn to hierarchy will disagree with the question. Therefore, it 
is vital that survey questions take into account, and exploit, the specifics of time and space (Gross and 
Rayner 1985). 
We offer a third and final challenge: Thus far, the bulk of empirical tests of CT has concerned Hypotheses 
Three, Eight, and Nine. In our count, this means that six of the theory's hypotheses have received 
relatively scant attention. This lacuna presents a major opportunity for researchers who would like to 
apply CT in innovative ways. 
In the next section we suggest which research methods could be useful for efforts to meet the challenges 
that we have just identified (namely, to overcome the traditional shortcomings of case studies, to improve 
surveys, and to test hitherto neglected parts of CT). The symposium contributions already rise to these 
challenges. Still more can be done, as we argue in the next section. 
 
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF TESTING CULTURAL THEORY 
 
Nesting of Case Studies 
To overcome the drawbacks of case study research, it is important to increase the number of these studies. 
This increase would overcome the “small n” objection, as well as reduce the influence of any one 
analyst's personal views. It would be helpful if more research were undertaken collaboratively and used 
the same operationalization of the theory and ensured inter-rater reliability. An accumulation of case 
studies would be especially effective if it followed the strategy of comparative nested analysis proposed 
by Evan Lieberman (2005). This mixed-method approach “combines the statistical analysis of a large 
sample of cases with the indepth investigation of one or more cases contained in the large sample” 
(Lieberman 2005, 435–36). By moving back and forth between the large sample of cases about which 
relatively little need to be known and the deep investigation of “model-testing” and “model-building” 
cases in the sample, comparative nested analysis of cases offsets the weaknesses and leverages the 
strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Taking Lieberman's advice, Brendon 
Swedlow and his collaborators (Swedlow et al. 2009) have constructed a research platform for 
collaborative nested analysis of cases that can be used to test all CT hypotheses. 
 
Combining Survey and Case Study Research 
Another mixed-method approach might combine survey-based tests of CT with pilot case studies to 
generate questionnaires that take into account the specific manifestations of the ways of life in a particular 
social domain at a certain time. Such preparatory field research might also reveal how to keep constant 
the social setting in which respondents perceive themselves to be. An interesting example has been 
provided by Dave Ingram (2010), a “pracademic” (McDonald and Mooney 2011) in the field of risk 
insurance. Relying on his professional experience, and interviews with a number of executives in the 
insurance sector, Ingram designed survey questions capable of capturing the cultural biases of insurance 
executives as they go about their daily business. He has made sure that the respondents complete these 
surveys in their offices as part of their work routine. Thus, Ingram has been able to fairly assess the extent 
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to which managers' cultural biases influence their financial decision making. His approach of using 
qualitative research methods to generate locally and temporarily valid questionnaires could be used in 
political science as well. 
 
Simulation 
Hypothesis Seven holds that social and political domains are characterized by the continuous splitting and 
merging, and waxing and waning, of four ways of life. This feature can be tested for consistency and 
illustrated through simulation, that is, building a mathematical model of the system that is under 
investigation and then running tests on that model. Thus, Don Braman, Dan Kahan, and James 
Grimmelmann (2005) contributed to resolving a long-standing problem in CT: given that social and 
political domains are supposed to be mixes of all ways of life, why is it still possible to distinguish 
between (more) egalitarian, individualistic, hierarchical, and fatalistic actors and systems? They resolve 
this issue by building a dynamic model that incorporates insights from social psychology about human 
cognition. Their model shows that, after an initial differentiation of opinions occurs, a rapid polarization 
of viewpoints follows. The waxing and waning of the four ways of life has also been simulated. Dave 
Ingram, Paul Tayler, and Michael Thompson (forthcoming) built an artificial life model in which 
companies choose between four behavioral strategies (derived from CT) on the basis of the business 
environment in which they are located. The sum of their choices then changes that environment, which in 
turn influences the companies' strategies. This model displays life-like features, such as the booms and 
busts that are typical of financial and other markets. It also captures the continuous waxing and waning of 
the four ways of life. A task awaiting cultural theorists is to build similar models capturing political 
processes. Mercedes Bleda and Simon Shackley (forthcoming) present a first attempt at this task in their 
article that describes a simulation model that analyzes the dynamics of public perceptions of risk and uses 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (“mad cow disease”) in the United Kingdom as a case study. 
 
Interactive Experiments 
A great affinity exists between CT and the analysis of social interaction systems as developed by social 
psychologist Robert Bales and associates over more than fifty years (Bales 2002). This social interaction 
systems-analysis was built in an inductive fashion through observing and analyzing the interactions of 
small groups of people, both in the laboratory and in the field. Bales' analysis shares many features with 
CT. His social world is dynamic (through clustering and polarizing), fractal, relational, and filled with 
multiple selves. In this world, value conflicts are inevitable, even in small groups (Bales 2002, 34). 
Bales measures these conflicting values, which also manifest themselves in behavior, with three bipolar 
dimensions, two of which appear close to the dimensions underlying CT's ways of life. According to 
Bales, whenever people interact, their behavior varies along the following lines: friendly versus 
unfriendly (corresponding to high and low group); rejection of authority versus acceptance of authority 
(resembling low and high grid); and dominant versus passive (conceptualized as personality traits not 
featured in CT). Through clustering within, and polarization between, sub-groups, different types of 
behavior (expressive of alternative values) emerge that approximate the four ways of life of CT. The 
utility of Bales' research for experimental tests of CT lies in its tried-and-tested tools for observing and 
measuring the values and behavior of people interacting. These tools need to be recalibrated for CT, but 
then could prove useful. Experiments could focus on CT's prediction that people think and reason by 
disagreeing (i.e., Hypothesis Five). They would test, in natural and/or artificial environments, whether the 
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four opposing ways of organizing, reasoning, justifying, and behaving emerged over time. Although not 
based in Bales' research, studies of the role of culture in public goods, bargaining, and trust experiments 
(Chai et al. 2011, this issue) further suggest the value of constructing interactive experiments to test CT 
hypotheses. 
 
Social Neuroscience 
Rose McDermott (2004) has highlighted the importance that social neuroscience can have for the study of 
politics. For CT, brain research may provide additional ways to test Hypotheses One, Two, and Three, 
among others. Like cultural theorists, neuroscientist Antonio Damasio argues that patterns of organizing 
are the basis of ways of reasoning (Damasio 1994, 190–91); there is a limited set of such patterns 
(Damasio 2010, 251); people make decisions based on little information (Damasio 2003, 146–47; cf. 
Wildavsky 1987); major mismatches are needed between people's expectations and their perceptions of 
reality for people to change their core beliefs (Bechara and Damasio 2005, 365); and good governance 
requires a balance of types of social conventions (Damasio 2003, 168–69). Building on this, 
neurophysicists Robert Turner and Charles Whitehead (2008, 54) speculated that CT's ways of life may 
activate different neural networks. If so, these should show up in functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
Here, the challenge would be to craft brain scan experiments that would keep social context constant and 
the influence of the observer limited. 
 
CONCLUSION 
If “good theory should be productive—[i.e., if] it should raise new questions and presume those questions 
can be answered without giving up its problem-solving strategies” (Kitcher 1982, 48)—then CT is in 
excellent shape. In other words, CT has proven itself to be fertile in the way it raises new questions and 
helps formulate new answers, as we hope you agree the contributions to this symposium attest. Yet, as we 
have argued here, much significant work remains to be done to test the many CT hypotheses listed at the 
outset of our article. We have outlined some of the achievements and challenges in testing CT hypotheses, 
as well as some promising methods for meeting remaining challenges. We hope that these methods 
provide useful guidance for political scientists who are interested in testing and developing CT in their 
areas of interest and expertise. 
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